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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES, ACCOUNTABILITY
LEGISLATION AND A DOUBLE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

To the States, or any one of them, or any city of the States, Resist much, obey
Little,
Once unquestioning obedience, once fully enslaved,
Once fully enslaved, no nation, state, city, of this earth, ever afterward resumes
its liberty.1
[W]hen the private corporation to be aided by eminent domain is as large
and influential as General Motors, the power of eminent domain, for all
practical purposes, is in the hands of the private corporation. The municipality
is merely the conduit . . . .
Eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. When individual citizens
are forced to suffer great dislocation to permit private corporations to construct
plants where they deem it most profitable, one is left to wonder who the
sovereign is.2

I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, states and municipalities have increasingly used
public assets to keep local businesses from relocating or to lure businesses
away from other states.3 Incentives take the form of direct subsidies, lowinterest loans or development bonds, investment tax credits, property, income
and franchise tax abatements, infrastructure improvements, worker training
and the gift or sale of property seized by eminent domain.4 The amount of

1. WALT WHITMAN, To the States, in LEAVES OF GRASS 9 (Avatine Press 1931).
2. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383 (1996);
Declaration of Policy, 1994 Iowa Acts (75 G.A.) ch. 1008, § 1 (1994). More than forty states
offer incentives that were rarely used as of 1980. See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public
Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 106 (1995).
4. See Steven R. Little, Corporate Welfare Wars: The Insufficiency of Current Constraints
on State Action and the Desirability of a Federal Legislative Response, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 849,
854-56 (1999).
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assistance given by these methods has also increased dramatically.5 At the
same time, states and municipalities have traditionally had no recourse in the
event an incentive recipient relocates again, cuts back commercial activity or
otherwise fails to deliver on promised jobs and economic benefits.6
Little evidence suggests that these economic development incentives are
having a net economic benefit in the communities that provide them.7 Rather,
since all states are doling out incentives, the competition among states for
location of businesses and industry results merely in the expectation of a public
contribution to business location decisions, and an overall shift in resources
from public to private.8 This shift in resources occurs at an inopportune time,
as in this decade many cities have gone bankrupt, or had to close or sell
facilities such as schools and hospitals, lay off essential employees and reduce
allocations to infrastructural improvements to avert fiscal collapse.9 Some
commentators have likened the interstate competition for business to a “race to
the bottom,”10 analogous to the frantic modification in corporate law at the turn
of the century to attract businesses into incorporating within a particular
state,11 but with potentially greater economic consequences to the participants.
Others have likened this competition to a “second Civil War,”12 and there has
been an academic outcry for a federal legislative response.13
5. It is impossible to decipher accurately how much assistance is given out annually, as
records are often not made public. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Special
Report: Corporate Welfare, a System Exposed, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998. Furthermore, the amount of
indirect subsidies to businesses in the form of tax abatements and credits is even more difficult to
calculate. Estimates of aid from state and local authorities, not including federal aid, run as high
as $50 billion annually. See KENNETH P. THOMAS, COMPETING FOR CAPITAL: EUROPE AND
NORTH AMERICA IN A GLOBAL ERA 159 (2000). In 1992, Massachusetts claimed a $2.5 billion
yearly loss due to commercial tax abatements, a figure amounting to more than one-third of the
state’s total estimated revenues absent the abatements. Meanwhile, Michigan identifies nearly
$4.9 billion in such tax incentives. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 388.
6. See Moss, supra note 3, at 103.
7. See generally GOOD JOBS FIRST, INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY,
MINDING THE CANDY STORE: STATE AUDITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 35-41 (2000)
[hereinafter GJF Audit Survey] (discussing the results of fifteen state audits that show little
evidence that development programs are improving the economic conditions they were created to
address). The debate on the economic value of development incentives is explored further infra
notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
8. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Law and Economics of Federalism: Business Incentives,
Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 479 (1997).
9. See Peter Dreier, America’s Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 1351, 1371-74 (1993) (discussing corporate flight as a root cause of the fiscal calamity
facing many American cities).
10. Gillette, supra note 8, at 451.
11. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. Enrich, supra note 3, at 377.
13. See generally Little, supra note 4; Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction
Subsidy Wars Resulting From a Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional
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A congressional act is usually seen as the most rational solution to the
interstate subsidy wars, because a state’s unilateral attempt to restrict location
subsidies would theoretically place that state at an immediate disadvantage in
competing for business.14 Several attempts by state governors to negotiate
non-compete agreements have failed.15 However, in recent years, states and
municipalities have begun adopting measures for self-empowerment in the
granting of development incentives. Since 1994, at least sixty jurisdictions
have enacted legislation that conditions receipt of assistance on meeting job
creation goals or other economic criteria, or otherwise holds businesses
accountable for public benefits expected to result from the incentives.16 Many
of these statutes include “clawbacks,”—provisions that allow state and local
governments to recoup their costs when recipients of development incentives
fail to live up to their end of the bargain.17 Other provisions permit the
development agency to rescind or recalibrate the assistance being given, or to
assess damages, upon the non-occurrence of certain specified goals.18 Thus
far, there has been little negative impact on the perceived business climate of
communities operating under these accountability statutes, and the trend is
being described as a “quiet revolution in economic development that the media
has overlooked.”19
Given the recent proliferation of accountability legislation, the financial
magnitude of the subsidies they govern, and the lack of success recipients have
had in meeting targets contemplated by the granting of incentives, it is nearly

Solutions and the Appropriateness of a Federal Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REV. 303
(1998); Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War Among
the States, THE REGION (March 1995), reprinted in 10 STATE TAX NOTES 1895 (1996); Mark
Taylor, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). For
a discussion of the form that such a federal act might take, see infra notes 104-10 and
accompanying text.
14. While governor of Illinois, Jim Edgar admitted that a unilateral cutback in business
subsidies would be “just as unrealistic as it would be for the United States to have withdrawn
unilaterally from the nuclear arms race.” Jim Edgar, Are Economic Development Incentives
Smart?, STATE GOV’T NEWS (Council of State Governments) (March 1993), reprinted in GREG
LEROY, NO MORE CANDY STORE 14 (1994). See also Chris Farrell, The Economic War Among
the States: An Overview, THE REGION (June 1996), available at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/
sylloge/econwar/farrel.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) (stating that a state’s unilateral act to
limit development incentives would be “economically suicidal”).
15. See Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on
Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427, 446-47 (1995).
16. See GOOD JOBS FIRST, INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY, THE POLICY
SHIFT TO GOOD JOBS: CITIES, STATES AND COUNTIES ATTACHING JOB QUALITY STANDARDS TO
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES 1 (2000).
17. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. STATE FIN. & PRO. § 7-314 (1999).
18. See infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
19. Interview, Greg LeRoy: On Incentives and Accountability, 17 STATE TAX NOTES 837,
838 (Sept. 30, 1999).
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inevitable that a case will soon arise to challenge the legality and enforceability
of these statutes. This Comment will make a comparative survey of such
legislation, discuss their relative economic and prudential merits and analyze
the language of the provisions therein as to their practicability and
constitutionality. Part II of this Comment will provide background information
to the study of development subsidies, concentrating on case studies that
demonstrate a need for accountability legislation. Part III will map out the
landscape of such legislation, using examples from Arizona, Iowa, Indiana and
Louisiana. Part IV will discuss legal and empirical challenges to the
enforceability of the statutes, including contractual challenges, the theory of
regulatory capture, weaknesses in statutory construction, and, especially, the
Dormant Commerce Clause, which this Comment will argue mandates, rather
than undermines, accountability in development incentives. Part V will
conclude with a call to states and municipalities for continued selfempowerment by seizing the opportunity to confront the traditional “prisoners’
dilemma” in interstate competition for location of businesses.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of Development Incentives

The practice of granting public funds to private businesses to encourage
development is nothing new in America’s history. Between 1722 and 1776, in
what has been called “a series of ‘shady land deal[s],’”20 the city of New York
granted much of its waterfront property to the city’s richest and most powerful
residents in exchange for restrictive covenants to build streets and develop the
city’s port facilities, while ensuring public access to certain roads and docks.21
Immediately after the formation of the union of American states,
Massachusetts, Georgia and others courted businesses with public assistance to
encourage growth in their underdeveloped economies.22 In the nineteenth
century, Midwestern cities fought fiercely to subsidize railways and to become
transportation and shipping hubs, and the federal government granted
significant tracts of land to encourage the expansion westward.23
20. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 45 (G. Edward White ed.,
1983) (quoting Milton Klein, Introduction to THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 30 (Milton Klein
ed., 1959)).
21. Id. at 48-51.
22. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH (rev. ed. 1969).
In fact, early corporate charters, which conferred upon banks, factories and other groups of
private individuals a quasi-governmental power to levy taxes on their members, provided a key
form of indirect assistance to the economy when public coffers were already drained from prerevolutionary war debt. See id. at 91-105.
23. See WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS 63-74 (1991) (discussing the role of
railroads in Chicago’s economic expansion).
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Much of the modern policy toward state incentives to economic
development began during the Great Depression, when tightened government
control of economic matters gained favor over the laissez-faire approach of
years past.24 Southern states instituted a series of programs which sought to
lure businesses from the North with promises of subsidies, tax relief, facilities,
training, and low-wage and non-unionized workers.25 Consistent with the
tendency of development programs to sprout during emerging economies or
times of economic crises, welfare programs reappeared in the 1970s and 1980s
when the country’s energy crisis and consequent shift from industrial activity
caused Northeastern and Midwestern cities to search for new incentives to
dissuade businesses from leaving for “sun belt” states.26 During these decades,
the state of Michigan particularly felt pressure to keep local jobs in the wake of
threats by General Motors Corporation (“GM”) to relocate to more
advantageous environs.
B.

The Michigan Example Part 1: The Poletown Case

Perhaps the most demonstrative example of the competing tensions
between the economic desperation of old, industrial cities and the desire for
moderation and accountability in economic development incentives is the case
of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.27 In 1980, GM
announced its plan to close its Cadillac and Fisher body plants in Detroit in
favor of a newer, more automated facility that could produce cars to compete
with a wave of lightweight and fuel-economic imports.28 GM notified the city
and offered to build the new facility in Detroit, employing 6,000 locals, if a
suitable site could be found.29 The City of Detroit, faced with an 18%
unemployment rate and a continuous exodus of manufacturers to “sun belt”
states, acted quickly, giving GM a list of nine proposed sites.30 Only a 46524. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 674.
25. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 14; Little, supra note 4, at 853. In 1936, often credited as
the first “shot fired” in the economic war between the states, the city of Durant, Mississippi
issued $25,000 in industrial revenue bonds and erected a building for Real Silk Hosiery Mills.
Nine years later, the city approved a bond of $60,000 to expand the facility. Real Silk never
employed more than 150 people locally and left Durant before its lease was up. Mississippi
remains the poorest state in the nation. See “Durant, Mississippi: Where It All Began,” in Barlett
& Steele, supra note 5.
26. Farrell, supra note 14.
27. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). The razing of Poletown for construction of a new GM
plant was documented in a documentary film, POLETOWN LIVES! (Information Factory 1983) (on
file with the Saint Louis University Law Library, or available by contacting Information Factory,
3512 Courville, Detroit, MI 48224), and in JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED
(Illini Books ed. 1990).
28. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 465-67 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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acre site, which would require the condemnation of an entire community of
first- and second-generation Polish Americans, was found adequate by GM.31
Subsequent correspondence between GM and the economic development
corporations of the cities of Detroit and neighboring Hamtramck demonstrates
the extent of control which GM maintained over the terms and conditions of
the project.32 These corporations were simply the “alter egos” of the
municipalities they represented, chaired by the mayors of each city.33 By a
series of memoranda, drafted by GM and left unaltered except for signatures
by the municipalities, the City of Detroit was required to take title to the
property within six months and make improvements to roads and utilities, at an
eventual cost of over $200 million, then sell the property to GM for $8
million.34 The two cities further agreed to grant GM the “maximum allowable
tax abatement under [Michigan] law for a period of 12 years.”35
Under Michigan’s “quick take” statute,36 the City of Detroit began the
process of condemnation and compensating the owners of the Poletown
properties. Even though alternative architectural plans had been proposed that
would have saved much of the homes therein, the city proceeded with notices
of eviction to the owners of the neighborhood’s 1,400 homes, 144 businesses
and 16 churches, many of which were to become landscaped lawns, ponds and
parking surrounding the plant.37 A minority of residents resisted, filing suit to
enjoin the condemnation proceedings and making as their headquarters the
Immaculate Conception Church in Poletown. However, despite the pleas of
the church’s priest, Father Joseph Karasiewicz, the archdiocese of the Catholic
Church sold the church for $1.3 million.38 Many local businesses soon
followed.39 By the time the Poletown case reached the Michigan Supreme
Court, which granted a motion for immediate consideration and an application
for leave to appeal prior to a decision by the lower appellate court,40 the case’s
conclusion was attended with an “overwhelming sense of inevitability.”41 By a
3-2 decision, rendered within ten days of oral argument, the court held that the
exercise of eminent domain for use by a private corporation carried the public

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 468-71.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 468-69 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.265(1)-(27) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2000).
WYLIE, supra note 27, at 51-52.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 130.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
Id. at 481 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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purpose of revitalizing the local economy and hence was a valid exercise of
police power under the Michigan constitution.42
C. Rising Incentives and the Problem of Accountability
The Poletown decision is consistent with judicial decisions in other states.
Each of these courts generally ask whether the object sought to be
accomplished by eminent domain is primarily for the benefit of the public as
compared with the benefit to private interests.43 This “ends justify the means”
analysis, combined with judicial deference to legislative determinations of
“public purpose,” has meant that the acts of economic development agencies
have gone virtually without judicial check for thirty years.44
Given this free rein, development authorities have given out increasingly
large incentive packages. In 1994, Alabama offered a package to MercedesBenz whereby it would clear and improve a factory site, upgrade utilities, buy
2,500 of the vehicles produced, and train and pay the salaries of the workers
for one year.45 Northwest Airlines received an incentive package from
Minnesota in 1991 worth nearly $838 million.46 Michigan gave inducements
totaling $80 million to Blue Water Fibre for a paper-recycling mill, at a cost of
$2.4 million dollars per job.47 Furthermore, in 1995, Ohio and the City of
Toledo put together an incentive package worth $262 million for a facility to
keep Chrysler manufacturing Jeeps in Toledo, even though the new plant
would employ over 700 fewer workers than before.48
Meanwhile, recipients of incentive packages were not always living up to
their end of the bargain. As of 1996, Northwest had not yet completed two
maintenance facilities, the target of fifty percent of Minnesota’s subsidy, even

42. See id. at 459. Subsequent to the court’s decision, residents of Poletown occupied the
Immaculate Conception Church in an illegal vigil. The City turned off the church’s water and
electricity, then raided the church with sixty members of a Special Weapons Assault Team
(SWAT). Twelve people were arrested, many of whom were in their seventies or older. For his
criticisms, Father Karasiewicz was effectively appointed to a position in the Catholic Church
where he would no longer be able to speak to the masses. See WYLIE, supra note 27, at 153-91.
43. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Warr Acres, 946 P.2d 1140, 1147-49 (Okla. 1997)
(Kauger, C.J., concurring).
44. See Moss, supra note 3, at 118-26; Maready v. Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626-27
(N.C. 1996).
45. See David E. Buchholz, Mercedes-Benz: The Deal of the Century, available at
http://www.cfed.org/main/econDev/bi/main/vignettes/mercedes.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
The Mercedes-Benz package would cost Alabama roughly $153 million, an expenditure of
between $153,000 and $220,000 per job promised. See id.
46. See Michael H. LaFave, Taking Back the Giveaways: Minnesota’s Corporate Welfare
Legislation and the Search for Accountability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1579 (1996).
47. See Farrell, supra note 14.
48. See David E. Buchholz, Toledo: Failing to Deliver, available at http://www.cfed.org/
main/econDev/bi/main/vignettes/toledocf.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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though the facilities had been scheduled for completion three years earlier.49
At the same time, the Mercedes plant in Alabama had cost the state nearly
twice the anticipated amount, produced one-half the expected jobs, and only
fourteen percent of the plant’s suppliers were located within Alabama
borders.50 The Toledo plant, ultimately with the aid of tax incentives, was
almost entirely automated, and the assembly of Jeeps by laser-guided robots
resulted in the disappearance of an additional 2,800 jobs.51 Absent specific
provisions in a contract or authorizing statute holding recipient businesses
accountable for promises of jobs and economic growth made during
negotiations, states and municipalities are quite often helpless against subsidy
abuse.52
D. The Michigan Example Part 2: The Willow Run Case
A good example of the helplessness of some municipalities in negotiating
incentive deals is the case of Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors
Corp. (“Willow Run Case”).53 In 1984 and 1988, the township of Ypsilanti,
Michigan, located just thirty miles from the Poletown plant, offered GM
twelve-year property tax abatements for investments related to the production
of a new car at its Willow Run plant.54 In its 1984 tax abatement application,
GM stated that its investment would create 200 jobs and help retain 4,300
more.55 Its 1988 application claimed 4,900 jobs would be retained by its

49. See LaFave, supra note 46, at 1580.
50. See Allen R. Myerson, O Governor, Won’t You Buy Me a Mercedes Plant?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1996, at F1.
51. Gideon Kanner, The New Robber Barons, NAT’L L.J., May 21, 2001, at A19. The
Toledo package is currently being challenged in federal district court for its constitutionality, as
discussed infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 649 F. Supp. 716, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying
the city relief where a recipient of financial incentives had made no clear commitment to operate
its plant for any period of time); In re Indenture of Trust, 437 N.W.2d 430, 436 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (finding that an incentive agreement created no obligation upon the recipient to forbear
from transferring jobs and equipment out of state).
53. 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
54. See id. at 558. The tax abatements were made pursuant to Michigan’s Plant
Rehabilitation and Industrial Development Districts Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 207.551-.571
(LEXIS through 1994 legislation). Under the Act, municipalities create industrial development
districts, which allows companies within such districts to apply for exemptions with the city and
state tax authorities. From 1975 to 1990, General Motors received tax abatements on investments
totaling more than $1.3 billion on its operations in Ypsilanti alone. See Taylor, supra note 13, at
676-77. Michigan’s authorizing statute is weak on protections to the state, authorizing tax
abatements that will “have the reasonable likelihood to create employment, retain employment,
prevent a loss of employment, or produce energy in the community in which the facility is
situated.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.559(2)(e) (emphasis added).
55. See Scott J. Ziance, Making Economic Development Incentives More Efficient, 30 URB.
LAW. 33, 36 (1998).
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investment.56 In negotiations, GM pledged to continue production and
maintain employment at the plant, subject to “favorable market demand.”57 In
1991, when GM decided to move its Willow Run operations to Arlington,
Texas, the township sued for injunctive relief.58
The trial court granted such relief, finding no contract in the authorizing
statute or tax abatement applications, but finding GM was bound by
promissory estoppel to remain at the Willow Run plant.59 It concluded that it
would be grossly unfair if GM, having “lulled the people of the Ypsilanti area
into giving up millions of tax dollars which they so desperately need to educate
their children,” was allowed to move its operations built with tax assistance
“simply . . . because it thinks it can make these same cars cheaper somewhere
else.”60 On appeal, however, the decision was reversed. Holding that
representations of job retention made during hearings and negotiations were
nothing more than “hyperbole and puffery,” the Michigan Court of Appeals
overturned the injunction on a clearly erroneous standard.61 As the court
noted, “[i]t has never been held that an abatement carries [inherently] a
promise of continued employment.”62
The Willow Run Case was frequently discussed by commentators.63 It
demonstrates that development incentives, by themselves, do nothing to
alleviate the problem of businesses leaving dependent communities in favor of
more profitable business climates.64 Absent a statutory or contractual
provision holding the recipient legally accountable, the recipient business can
still relocate at any point.
E.

The Economic Debate

Numerous studies indicate that businesses do not decide where to invest on
the basis of development incentives.65 Moreover, there are indications that
such incentives have no net benefit to the individual communities that provide

56. See id.
57. Willow Run Case, 506 N.W.2d at 558.
58. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 36.
59. See Willow Run Case, 506 N.W.2d at 558.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 559.
62. Id. at 561.
63. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Company Closings and Community Consequences, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1994); Ziance, supra note 55, at 36-38; Gilbert, supra note 15, at 449-50;
Annett Pinckney, Tax Abatements and Industrial Location: Township of Ypsilanti, Mich. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 59 TAX NOTES 1537 (1993); Moss, supra note 3, at 126-28.
64. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 37.
65. See Peter O’Brien, The Automotive Industry: The Permanent Revolution, in INDUSTRY
ON THE MOVE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL RELOCATION IN THE
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 53, 81 (G. van Liemt ed., 1992); Moss, supra note 3, at 109.
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them.66 For example, Louisiana granted tax exemptions that cost its school
system $941 million during the 1980s.67 During the same period, it remained
among the lowest ranking states in adult literacy and average teacher pay,68
and was one of the slowest growing states in terms of personal income.69
South Carolina, meanwhile, has added 200,000 jobs since 1990 via a series of
“sweetheart” tax breaks to companies, but remains dead last in high school
SAT scores, retains four homes in ten that are unconnected to sewers, and
maintains a strained tax base that allows little leeway in improvement to the
public infrastructure.70 Finally, Alabama, whose multimillion-dollar courting
of a Mercedes plant as discussed supra, is last in elementary and secondary
school spending.71
The failure of these southern states to bolster their local economies by the
use of development incentives may not be because the incentives, in a vacuum,
fail to stimulate investment decisions. Rather, low-performing states are often
unable to outbid wealthier states for development projects in a competitive
environment where all states are willing to spend public dollars to encourage
private investment.72 Given the relative inability of development incentives to
redistribute capital into under-performing economies and the widespread
public sentiment against welfare generally, one is left to wonder why states and
municipalities engage in bidding wars for industry location at all.
The traditional explanation is that they do so out of necessity; that if they
did not offer companies incentive packages, another locality would, luring
away vital businesses. The problem is often described by the “prisoners’
dilemma” analogy.73 In the prisoner’s dilemma, two co-conspirators to a crime
are interrogated independently by the authorities, who try to get confessions
from each implicating the other. Because each prisoner faces the stiffest
sentence if he remains silent and the other confesses, each one confesses out of
fear that the other will first. Thus, two prisoners who share the common goal
of testimonial silence and subsequent acquittal, each compromise their best
interest when thrown into competition with one another.74
66.
67.
68.
69.

See generally GJF Audit Survey, supra note 7, at 35-41.
See Moss, supra note 3, at 110.
See id.
See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, REVISED STATE
ESTIMATES FOR PERSONAL INCOME 1969-1998 (1999).
70. Jay Hancock, S.C. Pays Dearly for Added Jobs, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 1999, at A1 (citing
a study by the Strom Thurmond Institute of Clemson University).
71. See Myerson, supra note 50.
72. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 6 (citing PETER S. FISHER & ALAN H. PETERS,
INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES: COMPETITION AMONG AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 26 (1998)).
73. See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 13, at 311-12; Taylor, supra note 13, at 693; Little, supra
note 4, at 858-59.
74. For a thorough discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 94-97 (1957).
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The analogy to the “economic war among the states” is clear.75 Although
states and municipalities will always be in competition for business, they
would enjoy the maximum economic benefit if such competition were based
on quality of education and public works, fiscal stability and regulatory
predictability rather than direct financial assistance.76 Most negotiations
between localities and businesses for location incentive packages happen
behind closed doors and without the knowledge of other competing localities.77
Thus, the local and state governments are forced to offer special treatment out
of fear that failure to do so will render them at a competitive disadvantage in
the economic development game.78
The aggregate economic impact of this competition is a shift in wealth
from labor to capital, from individuals to corporations or from the public realm
to private concerns.79 First, at least a portion of the state revenues allocated to
capital investment would presumably otherwise have been spent for some
purpose that benefited labor—perhaps health care, education or social
security.80 Second, that portion of state or local revenue which would have
derived from the cash, taxes or other resources being forfeited via the
development incentive must either be borne elsewhere, in the form of higher
property or sales taxes, or result in a reduction of public goods and services.81
75. Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 13.
76. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 693.
77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1505.07(K) (West 1999) (requiring that all
information provided in applications for public assistance be kept confidential); CAL. GOV. CODE
§ 6254.15 (West Supp. 2001) (exempting from the Freedom of Information Act disclosure
information provided in connection with a subsidy proposal). The confidentiality of these
negotiations creates the potential for “whipsawing,” or using the possibility of more attractive
offers from competing states to drive up the negotiated value of incentive packages. See Moss,
supra note 3, at 132. For example, in 1992 and 1993, staff of Intel Corporation visited six
southwestern states with prepared reports asking for tax credits, relocation assistance, employee
training and other perks as inducements to locate a new semiconductor fabrication plant in that
state. See John Howe & Mark Vallianatos, Making Corporations Accountable Through
Legislative Initiatives, in PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 43, 45 (Grassroots Policy
Project 1998). By playing one state against another, Intel eventually landed a deal in Rio Rancho,
New Mexico that garnered them a thirty-year tax exemption and other perks worth nearly $300
million. See Intel: A Cautionary Tale?, available at http://www.cfed.org/main/econDev/bi/main/
case_studies/Intel.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001). In response to this practice, some districts have
enacted “right to know” laws, which require that agency review of information given in
connection with applications for financial assistance be reported to the public. See Howe &
Vallianatos, supra, at 44 (discussing the “right to know” element of the Boston living wage
ordinance).
78. See Merrill Goozner, Governments Rethink Corporate Tax Breaks, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14,
2000, at N1.
79. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 4.
80. See id. at 17 n.11.
81. See Peter Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report (AALS Paper Draft July 24,
2001) (on file with the author).
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Indeed, corporate income taxes as a percentage of nationwide tax revenue
decreased in the United States from 20.3% in 1955 to 9.6% in 1996.82
Moreover, while a jurisdiction to which a recipient business relocates may be
able to claim a net increase to its tax base from that single transaction, any
such increase is a fortiori less than the decrease to the tax base in the
jurisdiction from which the recipient business departs, so long as the new
jurisdiction was offering more than the former was already giving.83 As the
economic development game is played nationwide, or even globally, the
movement of capital from one jurisdiction to another ultimately does not
collectively increase the number of taxable sources of income, but instead
depletes the competing jurisdictions’ collective ability to provide public goods
and services.
Economists willing to defend development incentives generally do so on
two grounds. First, some argue that multi-state bidding for investment is not a
“race to the bottom,” but is itself an efficient system whereby the participant
jurisdictions will only bid up to the point at which marginal benefits, such as
the increased tax revenue from additional jobs, no longer exceed the marginal
cost, including the incentive itself as well as the cost of additional public
services.84 Meanwhile, recipient businesses would only relocate when the
incentive package and resultant synergies exceed the relocation costs, and the
intersection of these two curves would supply a static price toward which
negotiating parties would tend to gravitate, a static price that ultimately results
in the taxing of capital investment at an economically optimal level. This
argument, however, ignores the possibility of governors, mayors, councilmen
and development officials factoring into the equation the political benefit from
luring a high-profile industry during their tenures, as well as the vast
informational asymmetry that develops when a private firm with confidential
information regarding actual costs and future strategies negotiates with a
public agency whose activities must be disclosed.85
The actual practice of development agencies, in fact, rarely involves an
effective evaluation of the economic costs and benefits from a particular
development incentive; nor is there commonly a consideration of the
likelihood of the recipient business relocating into the community absent the
incentive.86 Thus, the actual practice of these agencies seriously undermines
the second defense of development incentives proffered by some economists—
that efficiencies are created when the superior local knowledge of development

82. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 8.
83. See Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 13.
84. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 8, at 488-93; see generally Dan Black & William Hoyt,
Bidding for Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1249 (1989).
85. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 5; see also supra note 77 (discussing “whipsawing”).
86. See GJF Audit Survey, supra note 7, at 36-41.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES

259

agencies serves to match industries with their most productive and synergistic
jurisdiction.87 Case studies indicate that these synergies are rarely sought,
much less achieved. For example, in 1994, the city of Amarillo, Texas
indiscriminately sent a check in the amount of $8 million to about 1,300
businesses nationwide, payable in the event that the recipient created 700 jobs
in the city.88 Therefore, even if competition for business in the form of
development incentives is theoretically defensible, the unrestrained practice of
development agencies has been such that predictions of inefficiency and public
fiscal problems will be more on target.
F.

Proposed Alternative Solutions to the Economic War Among the States

Many commentators have proposed judicial and legislative solutions to the
problem of competition in bidding on business location decisions.
1.

Invalidation by the Commerce Clause

Some have claimed that the Commerce Clause89 may operate as a restraint
on state activity in bidding wars.90 By construction, the Commerce Clause
operates negatively as a limitation on state power to regulate or otherwise
interfere with interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional
action.91 When state legislation conflicts with the clause’s purpose of
protecting a national common market, it becomes subject to judicial review as
to whether its burden on interstate commerce outweighs the local interest in the
particular legislation.92 If that burden is clearly excessive, the law will be
struck down.93
Arguably, Commerce Clause jurisprudence would play its intended role by
“preventing the harmful consequences of competitive state efforts to distort the
national economy for parochial ends.”94 The doctrine as it stands now
invalidates laws that propagate “economic protectionism” by discriminating
against out-of-state interests in favor of local ones.95 In fact, there exists a long
line of Supreme Court decisions invalidating state tax laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce by giving preferential treatment to in-state

87. See Gillette, supra note 8, at 485.
88. See Jane Seaberry, Amarillo Lures Businesses with $8 Million Checks, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1994, at D1.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“the Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
90. See generally Enrich, supra note 3; Walter Hellerstein & Dan Coenen, Commerce
Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996).
91. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
92. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
93. See id.
94. Enrich, supra note 3, at 468.
95. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981).
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economic activity.96 Though development incentives are specifically targeted,
their statutory authority often makes incentives available to any corporation
meeting certain minimum requirements and willing to relocate within the
state.97 Investment tax credits, which give a direct tax savings for every dollar
of in-state investment, are often cited as the paradigmatic example of a
constitutionally impermissible development incentive.98
Other development incentives, such as direct subsidies, may distort the
market in favor of a particular in-state enterprise, but they do so at the equal
exclusion of other in-state and out-of-state businesses. Even if that constitutes
preferential treatment to in-state interests, the state is attempting to foster local
welfare only by spending the financial resources of its residents.99 Property tax
exemptions also seem particularly insulated because nonresidents would not be
subject to the tax in the first place. At present, the Supreme Court has yet to
decide the issue,100 primarily because the class of plaintiffs with standing to
challenge development incentives, namely interstate businesses, are the
primary beneficiaries of such incentives.101
The theory was, however, recently debated in a federal district court,
where a consortium of concerned individuals and small businesses challenged
the grant by Ohio and the city of Toledo of a $280 million incentive package to
retain a Jeep manufacturing plant, now operated by DaimlerChrysler, Inc., at
its current location.102 The tax provisions challenged, in particular, include a
credit against Ohio’s corporate excise tax and a property tax abatement on the

96. See, e.g., South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) (holding that a
state franchise tax scheme that allowed domestic corporations to reduce the par value of their
stock while denying foreign corporations the same opportunity impermissibly discriminated
against interstate commerce); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997) (striking down a Maine property tax exemption restricted to organizations that served
primarily in-state interests); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (invalidating state tax
scheme requiring shareholders in foreign corporations to pay a tax on a higher percentage of their
stock’s value than shareholders in exclusively domestic corporations); Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v.
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (invalidating one-time Missouri use tax imposed on personal
property purchased outside the state in all political subdivisions where the use tax exceeded the
intrastate sales tax).
97. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 83A, § 5-1102 (2000) (providing an automatic income tax
credit to any certified business that creates or expands an in-state business facility that results in
the creation of sixty or more jobs in specified industries).
98. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 434-37; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 817-18.
99. See Gillette, supra note 8, at 482.
100. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) (“We have never
squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so now. We have,
however, noted that ‘direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul’ of
the negative Commerce Clause.”) (citations omitted).
101. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 323.
102. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
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plant’s machinery and equipment.103 In any event, and without immediately
passing on the merits of the Toledo claim, this Comment will presume that at
least one relocation incentive would pass constitutional muster for the purpose
of demonstrating the problems with applying current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to recent accountability legislation, as will be done in Part IV,
infra.
2.

A Federal Legislative Response

Given the Commerce Clause’s purpose in protecting the economic unity of
our nation,104 there seems to be a federal interest in constraining the use of
industrial location subsidies. Such a constraint could be effectuated in many
ways: by conditioning federal grants upon limiting the use of location
subsidies,105 by imposing an excise tax upon the subsidies106 or by creating a
private right of action similar to that which exists under antitrust law.107
Representative David Minge of Minnesota recently proposed the Distorting
Subsidies Limitation Act,108 which would require that grants or tax deferrals be
taxed at the same rates that currently apply to other corporate income.109
While the House Budget Committee held a hearing on this bill and other
concerns relating to unnecessary business subsidies,110 the bill remains in
committee.
3.

International Trade Agreements

Multilateral trade agreements, such as the proposed Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (hereinafter, “MAI”) and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (hereinafter, “NAFTA”) may limit economic development
incentives as they are currently used in practice.111 These agreements forbid
certain laws that put foreign investors at a commercial disadvantage in relation
to domestic investors.112As such, the test of discriminatory effect under
NAFTA and MAI is stricter than the scrutiny given development incentives

103. See id. Though the original complaint was dismissed by the District Court, that
dismissal is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
104. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1940).
105. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 710-12 (providing an example of such a model statute).
106. See Little, supra note 4, at 891.
107. See id. at 890-91.
108. H.R. 1060, 106th Cong. (1999).
109. See id.
110. See Unnecessary Business Subsidies, Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget of the
House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (1999).
111. See GEORGETOWN LAW CENTER AND CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT,
FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EMERGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND TRADITIONAL STATE/LOCAL AUTHORITY 3 (Apr. 1999 draft).
112. See id. at 7.
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under the Dormant Commerce Clause.113 Furthermore, the Uruguay Round
Subsidies Agreement,114 negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, would constrain domestic subsidies that are targeted at one or a
limited group of specific enterprises.115 A thorough discussion of the impact of
these agreements is beyond the scope of this Comment.116 Considering the
fact, however, that these agreements must be enforced by member nations, and
that the discriminatory impact of the location incentives thereunder must be
international in scope, there is little reason to believe these international
agreements will have a dramatic impact on local economic development
activity.117
4.

State Regulation and Multilateral Agreements

As discussed before, states and municipalities perceive themselves in a
prisoner’s dilemma whereby limitation and regulation of subsidy arrangements
would render them at a competitive disadvantage in the market for location of
businesses.118 An often-suggested strategy for curbing development bidding
has been to negotiate a noncompetition agreement among the states.119 During
the 1970s, Michigan Governor William Milliken called for such a compact.
Several midwestern states attempted a similar regional agreement in 1988.120
In October of 1991, Connecticut, New Jersey and New York signed a pact
agreeing to end attempts at luring businesses from each other.121 To date,
however, there has been no legal action taken under this agreement, despite
frequent relocation of businesses among the states involving significant
incentive packages.122 It does not appear likely that a binding agreement
among the fifty states will be negotiated anytime soon.123

113. See id.
114. AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316,
at 1533 (1994).
115. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 327-31 (stating that most location incentives would fail
to meet the criteria of the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement).
116. For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between international agreements and
economic development incentives, see MORRIS L. SWEET, REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AMERICA (1999).
117. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 331.
118. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
119. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 446.
120. See id. See also Little, supra note 4, at 875-76.
121. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 447; Schaefer, supra note 13, at 322.
122. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 321.
123. See id. at 322-23. Furthermore, such an agreement may violate the Compact Clause of
the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State”). The Compact Clause
prohibits agreements that encroach upon federal power or increase the political power of the
states. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm., 434 U.S. 452, 466-70 (1978).
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III. LEGISLATION
Considering the difficulties in negotiating a nationwide non-competition
agreement, the unlikelihood of federal intervention and the lack of precedent
for a suit enjoining subsidies under the Commerce Clause, it is not surprising
that states and municipalities have begun to look for local legislative solutions
to the problem of unchecked competition for investment. One effective
rallying point for critics of the current practice of development agencies has
been the adoption of what has generally been termed “accountability
legislation,” that is, legislation that attaches minimum employment, wage,
tenancy or other standards to incentive packages.124 Indeed, in the last twenty
years, at least fifty-six cities, counties and states have passed provisions125 that
often allow for the reclamation of the value of the tax abatement or other
assistance if the recipient fails to meet certain performance requirements.126
The advantage of these measures is that they may be implemented
unilaterally127 with little apparent harm to the perceived business climate of the
community enacting them.128 The trend toward using accountability measures
in incentive packages has been described as a turning point in the cutthroat
interstate battle for business.129
Accountability legislation seeks to ensure that public investment in private
companies yield public benefits.130 As such, it has the potential to address
some of the political problems that undermine economic defenses to location
incentives.131 There are three categories of accountability legislation: (1)
“right to know” laws that grant public access to information regarding
incentive application and grants; (2) laws that set minimum standards for
corporations qualifying for public assistance; and (3) laws with provisions that
enforce these standards by allowing the state or municipality to recoup its
124. See Enrich, supra note 81.
125. See Goozner, supra note 78.
126. See id.
127. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 429.
128. Telephone Interview with Greg LeRoy, Director, Good Jobs First, a project of the
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (Oct. 24, 2000). For example, Arlington, Texas, the
beneficiary of the GM move discussed in The Willow Run Case, was able to attract the plant
despite a somewhat stringent contract governing the incentive. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 41.
See also Kary L. Moss et al., Legal Strategies to Achieve Tax Subsidy Accountability, in PUBLIC
SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 58-76, 74 n.10 (Grassroots Policy Project 1998).
129. See Michael Phillips, Localities Force Firms to Keep Promises, WALL ST. J., June 26,
1996, at A2.
130. See LaFave, supra note 46, at 1590. See also Declaration of Policy, IOWA ACTS 1994
(75 G.A.) ch. 1008 §1 (declaring that “[p]ublic subsidies should be in the form of investments in
people, resulting in a better educated and skilled workforce,” and that “[t]he state owes it to its
citizens to ensure that all development agreements include provisions for recouping subsidies
when businesses fail to meet [their] obligation [of delivering on promised benefits]”).
131. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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investment.132 This section will discuss a few samples of these laws,
specifically those that set standards to be incorporated into incentive
agreements and include a means of enforcing such standards.133 Relevant
inquiries, to be made in Part IV of this Comment, include the specificity with
which the statute addresses future contingencies, the extent of the discretion
given local development authorities in defining contractual terms and
conditions and the extent to which these conditions burden interstate
commerce.
A.

Iowa’s New Jobs and Income Act

Under Iowa’s New Jobs and Income Act,134 development incentives may
be in the form of an investment tax credit, a tax exemption for machinery and
equipment, a community property tax exemption or other benefits. The
recipient business must demonstrate, prior to receiving benefits and subject to
approval by the community where the business is located, that it (1) has not
closed or substantially reduced operations in another area of the state to
relocate, (2) will provide 80% of the cost of medical and dental care for its
full-time employees, (3) will pay a median wage of at least eleven dollars per
hour (indexed to 1993 dollars) or 130 percent of a county-wide median wage,
(4) will make a minimum investment of $10 million (indexed to 1993 dollars)
and (5) will create at least fifty (and sometimes seventy-five) jobs.135 Failure
to comply with performance requirements may subject the recipient to
penalties or require that recipient repay the assistance according to a calibrated
scale based on the percentage of requirements met.136
B.

Arizona’s Standards for Eligibility for Economic Development Assistance

Arizona’s economic development accountability law137 is an example of a
weaker and more discretionary statutory construction. Under Arizona law, the
state’s Economic Development Commission selects candidates for financial

132. See Howe & Vallianatos, supra note 77, at 43-44.
133. For examples of such accountability laws not discussed herein, see, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 12-217(m) (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-5(a) (West 1997); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.24-010 to -150, and §§
154.26-010 to 154.26-100 (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 13070-J to 13070-M
(West 1996, supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5215 (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 7-314 (2000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83A, § 5-1102 (1999); MINN. STAT. §
116J.994 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4107 (1996); S.B. A03325, 1999-2000 Reg. Session
(N.Y. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.17 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439 (Michie
1998).
134. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 15.326-.337 (West 1995).
135. See id. § 15.329(1).
136. See id. § 15.330. See also Gilbert, supra note 15, at 484-85.
137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1505.07 (West 1999).
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assistance projects based on a number of factors, including (1) the anticipated
resulting increase in the state’s tax base, (2) the extent of public benefit, (3) the
wages to be paid, (4) the number of jobs created, (5) the comparative cost of
the project, (6) the percent of products being sold out of state and (7) any
related benefits.138 No single factor is dispositive and no minimum amounts
are mandated, except that assistance may not exceed fifty percent of the
estimated increase in tax revenue directly or indirectly deriving from the
transaction.139 The recipient business must enter into a memorandum of
understanding with certain discretionary minimum standards that allow the
commission, at its instance, to stop, readjust or recapture all or part of the
state’s investment.140
C. Indiana’s Economic Development for a Growing Economy Tax Credit
Indiana’s Economic Development for a Growing Economy Tax Credit141
authorizes a credit for investments that are economically sound, create new
jobs, will have an overall positive fiscal impact for the state, that are actively
being courted by other states and for which there exists a disparity between the
cost of locating in Indiana and the cost of locating in the competing state.142
Recipients must enter into a tax credit agreement, which requires that average
wages of the employees of the qualifying business exceed the average wages in
the county in which the project is located, and that operations must be
maintained at that location for at least two times the number of years in the
term of the tax credit.143 While the terms of required agreements in Indiana are
stricter than under Arizona law, the tax commissioner retains discretion as to
whether to enforce the agreement, and the amount received in return may not
exceed the total amount of the credit.144
D. Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act
Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act145 states its purpose as “an
inducement to locate in Louisiana for any business operation that does not
have to be located in Louisiana in order to profitably and rationally conduct its
business.”146 The Act creates an incentive tax credit to be given for up to ten

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. § 41-1505.07(B).
See id. § 41-1505.07(D).
See id. § 41-1505.07(H).
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (West 1996).
See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 483.
See id. at 483-84.
See id. at 483-84.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2451 et seq. (West 2001).
Id. § 51: 2452.
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years147 to qualifying businesses engaged in a “basic industry” and calculated
according to a complex formula.148 Qualifying businesses must contract with
the state, subject to approval by the governor,149 to pay its employees (eighty
percent of which should be employed full-time) an average of one and one-half
times the minimum wage, with a total gross payroll of new jobs to exceed one
million dollars within three years of contracting with the state.150 Failure to
meet the gross payroll requirement within three years will result in an increase
in the recipient’s tax liability in the amount of any credits previously taken.151
After qualification and the filing of an initial report,152 the incentive tax credit
is self-executing. It is notable that the Louisiana tax credit calculation
considers cost to the state in the formula, as the credit is a percentage of the
estimated tax revenue resulting from the new jobs created, minus the state
costs in the form of education and social services incident to those jobs.153
IV. ANALYSIS
Thus far, there are only a few isolated incidents of states and localities
using accountability statutes and clawback provisions to recoup their
investment when recipients fail to live up to their end of the bargain.154 In
1996, New York City recovered $60,000 from Bank of America when it
transported equipment out-of-state that had been purchased with a city sales
tax exemption.155 At the same time, Indianapolis had publicly expressed an
intent to recover tax abatements from companies that had failed to maintain
their qualification for the tax break.156 Since the majority of these statutes
have been recently enacted,157 it is far too early to declare them a success or
failure. A predictive analysis of future incentive deals, however, based on the
provisions of the enabling legislation, may be derived from principles of
contract law, constitutional law and political and economic theory.

147. See id. § 51:2454(A)-(B) (providing for a five-year initial contract and the possibility for
a five-year renewal).
148. See id. § 51:2455. The term “basic industry” is defined at § 51:2453(1)(a) of the Act and
includes transportation, construction, communications, equipment rental, computer-related
services, medical services and engineering and architectural services.
149. See id. § 51:2454(A).
150. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2455(E).
151. See id. § 51:2457(B).
152. See id. § 51:2457(A).
153. See id. §§ 51:2453(2)-(5), 51:2455.
154. See Howe & Vallianatos, supra note 77, at 55.
155. See id.
156. See Phillips, supra note 129, at A2.
157. See Accountability Legislation, in PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 88-96
app. (Grassroots Policy Project 1998).
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Contractual Provisions

As noted above, and demonstrated by The Willow Run Case,158 the success
of these accountability statutes will depend in part on the specificity and
enforceability of the legislative or contractual provisions that legally enable the
use of incentives. Contractual provisions are always available to the municipal
lawyer who wishes to condition an incentive package on compliance by the
recipient with certain terms. They offer the added flexibility of tailoring each
incentive deal to the particular needs of the parties. But absent a statutory
provision requiring a minimum of accountability, economic development
authorities have not shown much enthusiasm in using contracts to ensure
performance.159
1.

Recalibrations

Incentive deals can be given teeth in several ways. First, the amount given
may be recalibrated upon the occurrence of a specified event; that is, the
amount of the assistance would be adjusted to reflect actual performance or
changing business conditions.160 Recalibrations may be de novo, in that future
expected benefits, but not past performance, will be used as the basis for
recalculating the amount of assistance given.161 Alternatively, contracts or
statutes may provide for a recalibration with clawbacks, which would adjust
future subsidies to recover overpayment based on past performance.162 For
example, under Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act,163 the recipient
business’s tax credit will be reduced in proportion to the extent the recipient
fails to meet certain gross payroll requirements.164 Another, more gentle
variation on the recalibrated incentive is the “ratcheted recalibration,” which
adjusts the subsidy gradually, in order to give the recipient business time to
adjust to the financial impact of the decrease in assistance.165
So long as all of the possible triggering events are accounted for in the
contract or enabling legislation, recalibrations may be the least problematic
accountability provision doctrinally, as well as the least abhorrent to recipient
businesses.166 However, provisions considering future contingencies may be
158. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
159. See Kary L. Moss et al., Legal Strategies to Achieve Tax Subsidy Accountability, in
PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 58, 59 (Grassroots Policy Project 1998)
(discussing a survey by the Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice that found most
development programs using contracts were required to do so by statute).
160. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 42.
161. See id. at 43.
162. See id.
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2451-:2461 (West 2001).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 151 and 153.
165. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 43.
166. See id.
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difficult to draft.167 More importantly, the dependence of these provisions on
future in-state activity may render them useless in the event a recipient wants
to leave the state entirely. For example, Louisiana’s calibrated reduction in tax
credits would do little to curb a business from leaving in the event the
company was not realizing overall profits.
2.

Rescissions

A legislature may also direct, or delegate to a development authority the
power to direct, that a public assistance contract be rescinded or cancelled
upon the occurrence of a certain specified event.168 As with any contractual
provision, this cancellation must be assented to by both parties and should be
clearly drafted. For example, Illinois’ High Impact Business tax credit169
provides for automatic cancellation if it is determined that the recipient would
have relocated to Illinois absent the tax credit or if the recipient otherwise fails
to comply with the terms and conditions of the statute.170 Once again, these
provisions do little to curb a relocating business that has no intention of
reaping the future benefits of in-state activities in any event, but they may
prevent a state from sinking substantial amounts of money into a failing
venture.
3.

Clawbacks

The most widely utilized enforcement mechanism in new accountability
legislation has been clawbacks.171 While the term “clawback” is sometimes
used to describe any type of subsidy accountability measure,172 as used in this
section it refers specifically to those provisions which enable a state or locality
to recapture all or part of the cost of its investment without regard to future
activity. For reasons discussed in the following two paragraphs, clawback
provisions must be carefully drafted to avoid a judicial designation as
liquidated damages.173 Typically this is done by referring to the recaptured
amount as a “payment” rather than “damages,”174 or by reinforcing the

167. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 466-73 (describing the problems related to the enforcement
of a Louisiana provision that tied a property tax exemption to certain environmental factors).
168. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 41.
169. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5 (West 1993).
170. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5(f).
171. See, e.g., Appendix, Accountability Legislation, in PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 88-96 (Grassroots Policy Project 1998) (charting at least 25 state and local
laws that include a clawback provision as a necessary condition to the granting of business
assistance).
172. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 3, at 138.
173. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 42.
174. Id.
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ongoing nature of the contract by requiring repayment on a sliding scale; that
is, requiring less to be repaid the longer the business remains in the state.175
For example, Iowa’s New Jobs and Income Act176 provides for a calibrated
system of recapture in the event that a recipient business fails to create a
certain number of new jobs to be negotiated by the development authority but
not less than fifty.177 In no event does the amount to be repaid exceed the
amount given in assistance. Similarly, Indiana’s clawback statute, the
Economic Development for a Growing Economy Tax Credit,178 limits
assessments against the recipient to the amount received in assistance.179 The
assessments, however, are discretionary and made only upon the request of the
director of the Commerce Department.180 This provides the authorized agency
with a significant amount of leeway to decide which non-compliant businesses
should be sanctioned, but also gives no assurances as to enforcement.
4.

Liquidated Damages and Penalties

Certain accountability measures provide for a monetary fee to be paid in
the event of default. Under contract law, these penalties will not be enforced if
classified as such by a court.181 Rather, to be an enforceable liquidation of
contractual damages, the amount to be paid “must be a reasonable estimate, at
the time of contracting,” of the damages likely to result from a breach, and the
estimate must be shown as necessary due to the difficulty in measuring
damages “after the breach occurs.”182 In the case of location incentives, the
difficulty in quantifying damages should be found where secondary losses
exist, such as those from incident businesses that fail when a vital economic
industry moves away.183 However, development authorities and legislatures
must consider the reasonableness of the estimate when drafting penalty and
clawback clauses. For example, where a clawback is scaled according to the
percentage of performance completed under the contract and the recipient
business is an industry of the type that is an integral part of the local economy,
it is less likely that a court will refuse to enforce the provision as a penalty.
175. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 460.
176. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 15.326-.337 (West 2000).
177. Id. § 15.330. Specifically, the statute provides that a business shall repay one-quarter of
the assistance given if it meets between 75 and 90 percent of the expected job quota, and one-half
of the assistance given if it meets between 50 and 75 per cent of the expected job quota. If the
recipient fails to meet one-half of the job quota, then it must repay its assistance in inverse
proportion to the percentage of expected jobs it did create.
178. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (Michie 1998).
179. Gilbert, supra note 15, at 484.
180. See id.
181. See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 417 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
182. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1985).
183. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 43.
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Political and Economic Theories

Another obstacle to the future proliferation and success of accountability
legislation is the threat of regulatory capture. “Regulatory capture” is the
phrase used to describe the theory that a legislative body or regulatory agency
will eventually represent the interests of a narrow group of people, rather than
those of the public at large.184 The theory derives from the observation by
economist Mancur Olson that members of a large group have less incentive to
participate in that group’s activities than those of a small group because active
participation is more difficult and less likely to contribute to the group’s
overall success.185 As a result, there is a tendency for smaller, more intensely
focused special interests, rather than nebulous “public” interests, to dominate
legislatures and regulatory agencies.186
As a practical matter, the theory of regulatory capture helps explain the
widespread existence of industrial location incentives. Such incentives are
substantially similar to the prototypical “capture” scenario, where “[a]
relatively small number of incumbent competitors support such measures with
intensity, while consumer opposition is diluted and widely distributed.”187 As
the problem of capture acts upon state legislatures, it also provides a potential
obstacle to the enactment of meaningful accountability statutes.188 However,
the continued efforts of certain public interest groups, such as Citizens for Tax
Justice, does serve to level the playing field.
The threat of regulatory capture is greatest where a state agency regulates a
particular industry or necessarily deals with a limited class of interests.189 In
the enactment of accountability legislation, a tension exists between the need
to mitigate the effects of regulatory capture by denying the responsible agency
absolute discretion in enforcement and the need to preserve flexibility so that
incentive deals may be adaptable to unforeseen circumstances. Generally, the
potential for regulated groups to influence regulatory policy increases in
proportion to the discretion vested in the regulating agency.190 Thus, Iowa’s
New Jobs and Income Act191 and Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act,192

184. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1021 (1988).
185. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
186. John Shepard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713,
724-25 (1986).
187. Id. at 725.
188. See id. at 732.
189. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169-70 (1990).
190. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999).
191. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 15.326-.337 (West 1995). See supra notes 134-136 and
accompanying text.
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two statutes that provide for mandatory recapture of incentives in the event of
default, will do more to mitigate the threat of regulatory capture than the
Indiana193 and Arizona statutes,194 which leave enforcement decisions to the
discretion of the authorizing office.
If authorized agencies do decide to go after some of the biggest offenders,
then it is a reasonable expectation that the recapture of incentives will be
challenged in court, given the size of the financial packages at stake.195 One of
the likely defenses will be that the recapture provisions violate the Commerce
Clause, with the allegation that these state laws improperly burden or
discriminate against interstate commerce.
C. Constitutional Issues: The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause196 provides an affirmative grant to Congress to
regulate interstate commercial activity, to avert “jealousies and aggressions”197
between the several states and to encourage a new nation’s prosperity through
“union and not division.”198 As a corollary to this grant of power, the United
States Supreme Court has construed the clause to prohibit the states from
interfering with Congressional authority by enacting laws that isolate each
state from the national economy by discriminating against competition from
outside the state.199 Though the contours of this judicial construction,
colloquially referred to as the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause, are
somewhat murky,200 its application to two areas of state legislation have been
clear. First, a state regulation that merely promotes the in-state economy by
making its regulatory and commercial frameworks more attractive to
businesses will not be deemed unconstitutional.201 Second, a state regulation
that discriminates against out-of-state interests by providing local businesses
with an economic advantage, even where the business could be operated more
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2451 et seq. (West 2001). See supra notes 145-153 and
accompanying text.
193. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (West 1996). See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying
text.
194. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1505.07 (1999). See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying
text.
195. For examples of large incentive deals, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
197. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
198. Id. at 523.
199. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (“The Court has
consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be constitutionally invalid . . . .”).
200. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959) (describing Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a “quagmire”).
201. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-37 (1977)
(refusing to hold that “a [s]tate may not compete with other states for a share of interstate
commerce” because “such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy”).
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efficiently outside the state, absent such regulation, is “virtually per se
illegal.”202 The Dormant Commerce Clause as it pertains to economic
development incentives represents a curious intersection of these two
principles, particularly where the incentive is expressly conditioned upon the
recipient’s continuing to remain within the regulating state’s borders or
engaging in hiring practices or other activities to the state’s benefit.
1.

Framers’ Intent

It has been contended that all location incentives, whether they are tied to a
system of recapture in the event of default or not, are inconsistent with the
Framers’ intent in creating a barrier-free trade union.203 From an economic
perspective, location incentives are essentially a disguised barrier to the free
movement of capital to the extent they redirect investments across borders to
areas in which they would not have occurred absent the incentive.204 Indeed,
some economic unions that fall short of a confederacy still impose quasiconstitutional limitations on economic aid granted by their member states.205
There is some basis for the notion that competition among the states in the
form of development incentives was a concern for the drafters of the
Constitution in vesting the federal government with the commerce power.
Alexander Hamilton, writing on commercial competition as a source of
contention among the states, expressed particular worry about states adopting
commercial policies peculiar to themselves, creating “distinctions, preferences,
and exclusions, which would beget discontent.”206 A “race to the bottom” in
location incentives creates rivalries among the states that are very similar to
those during the time of the nation’s confederacy.207 However, Alexander
Hamilton, himself, was granted a tax abatement by the state of New Jersey in
1791 to start a business.208 Furthermore, there exists equal evidence that the
divisive commercial policies about which the Framers were concerned may

202. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). See also Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 624 (“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se
rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
203. This is the vision of the Commerce Clause attributed to James Madison, who intended
the clause to be self-executing in its prevention of state interference with interstate commerce,
thereby fostering economic union. See Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 13
204. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 4.
205. See, e.g., European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty, art. 87-89 (ex. art. 92-94)
(limiting state aid to enumerated circumstances that carry a presumption of compatibility with the
European common market).
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982).
207. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 423.
208. See Edward Regan, Government, Inc., Creating Accountability for Economic
Development Programs, RESEARCH CENTER OF THE GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION 25 (Apr. 1988).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES

273

have been protective tariffs rather than direct subsidies or indirect economic
incentives.209
2.

Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce

Consistent with the notion of Framers’ intent, early Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence analogized a state’s impermissible use of its tax and
police powers for the purpose of economic protectionism to customs duties that
undermined the free trade union created by the Constitution.210 Such is the
origin of the Court’s anti-discrimination case law, which renders invalid any
state law which manifestly discriminates against interstate commerce, unless
the law advances a legitimate local purpose and there exists no less restrictive
alternative.211 Discrimination, in this sense, has come to mean the “differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter.”212 For example, a Maine charitable property
tax exemption that excluded a portion of the tax benefit to charities “conducted
principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine”213
facially discriminated against interstate commerce and was per se invalid
under the Commerce Clause.214
Statutes that are facially discriminatory against interstate commerce are not
the only statutes that may fail to pass constitutional muster. Rather, states
which enact statutes that have as their apparent intent the furtherance of a
legitimate local purpose, but also have the practical effect of discriminating
against out-of-state competition, must also justify the discriminatory impact in
terms of the local benefits deriving from the statute and the unavailability of a
less restrictive alternative.215 For example, in Minnesota v. Barber,216 the
209. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 30; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 847; see also
3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (rev. ed. 1966)
(reprinting a letter from James Madison attributing the inclusion in the Constitution of the
Commerce Clause to concern over tax abuse by importing states).
210. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33 (1949).
211. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding
that a surcharge imposed on out-of-state waste facially discriminated against interstate commerce
and was unconstitutional).
212. Id. at 99.
213. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568 (1997).
214. See id. at 575-76.
215. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (stating that a contrary view
“would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action . . . save
for the rare instance where a state artlessly disclosed an avowed purpose to discriminate against
interstate goods.”). The test which the Court has used to determine the existence of a valid
statutory purpose unrelated to economic protectionism and the non-existence of a less restrictive
alternative will be referred to herein as the “strictest scrutiny” test. Thus far only one law has
survived the “strictest scrutiny” analysis. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a
Maine prohibition against importing bait fish because there was no other means by which the
state could prevent the spread of parasites damaging to its native fish population). A lesser
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Court invalidated a law forbidding the sale of meat in Minnesota unless the
animal had been inspected by a state official within the twenty-four hours
before slaughter. Though the ostensible purpose of the statute was to protect
the health of Minnesota citizens, its necessary effect was to exclude from that
market any animal slaughtered outside the state.217 The Court viewed such an
effect as contrary to the notion of the republic as a free trade union, and struck
down the statute where its object, ensuring the meat’s safety, could have been
accomplished by less restrictive means.218
3.

Burden on Interstate Commerce

The threshold question, then, in determining whether a state statute is so
contrary to the free flow of interstate commercial trade that it must be
invalidated by the Commerce Clause is whether it discriminates against
interstate commerce or regulates commerce even-handedly.219 If the statute
discriminates against interstate commerce, either facially or in effect, then the
Court will analyze the statute under the “strictest scrutiny” test outlined
above.220 Determination that a law is nondiscriminatory does not yet end the
analysis. A statute may regulate even-handedly yet fail Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis if it incidentally burdens interstate commerce and that burden
is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”221 If the
statute’s purpose is to protect the health and welfare of its citizens, then the
nondiscriminatory statute is likely to be upheld, as this is a subject of local
regulation which has long been recognized.222 On the other hand, less vital
local interests may not be sufficient. In Pike v. Bruce Church,223 for example,
the Court refused to enforce an Arizona law that, as applied to an Arizona
grower of cantaloupes who packed the fruit in California, would forbid the
grower from transporting the fruit out-of-state unless they were packaged
according to Arizona law.224 The grower thus faced the loss of its entire year’s

scrutiny may be available for laws that are discriminatory in effect, but where a legitimate local
purpose is advanced and the law is not “patently” discriminatory. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc.
v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 343 n.5 (1992).
216. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
217. See id. at 322.
218. See id. at 328-29.
219. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
220. See supra note 215 and accompanying text; see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural
Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 411 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
221. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
222. See S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 796 (1945) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
223. Pike, 397 U.S. at 137.
224. See id. at 146.
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crop, as it owned no nearby Arizona packing facility.225 This burden clearly
outweighed the purpose of the law, which was to protect the reputation of
Arizona growers by prohibiting Arizona cantaloupes from being deceptively
packaged.226
4.

Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Applied

The Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause tests seem
straightforward enough in theory. In each case, the object sought to be
achieved is “a national market for commercial activity,”227 an object often
overstated in the case law with broad brushstrokes of rhetorical eloquence.228
In application, however, these tests have caused “negative-commerce-clause
jurisprudence [to drift] far from its moorings.”229 This is especially so in
application to development incentives, where the Court’s anti-discrimination
case law strictly applied would require arbitrary restructuring in favor of one
taxing scheme over another, each with the same purposes and effects, and in
application to accountability legislation, where the case law would effectively
undermine language that seeks to further national economic growth and
responsibility.
A Bright Line Blindly Drawn. In application, the Court’s focus on the
disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-state enterprises in its antidiscrimination case law, rather than the distortion of the national economy with
which the Framers were concerned,230 would result in the different
jurisprudential treatment of location incentives that have substantially similar
purposes and effects. For example, investment tax credits arguably facially
discriminate against interstate commerce by offering businesses a lower tax

225. See id. at 140.
226. See id. at 142.
227. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
228. Such language, used in dicta, often makes a persuasive case for either side of the debate
over the constitutionality of development incentives. Compare, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (“The Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes
requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be
performed elsewhere.”), and West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994)
(analogizing a subsidy to in-state producers of milk to protective tariffs and “their distorting
effects on the geography of production”), with Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429
U.S. 318, 336 (1977) (“Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their tax
systems to encourage the growth and development of interstate commerce and industry.”), and
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (“No one disputes that a State may enact
laws . . . that have the purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry.”). See also
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90 at 791-92 (introducing the “palpable tension” in the Court’s
anti-discrimination case law).
229. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
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burden for each new facility or piece of equipment transferred in-state than that
which would be faced by an equivalent business out-of-state.231 Meanwhile, a
property tax abatement generally places no discriminatory burden on out-ofstate entities because they are not subject to the tax in the first place.232
Investment tax credits and property tax abatements, however, share the same
economic intent and effect—they both seek to encourage in-state investment,
not by efficiencies and infrastructural advantages, but by directly reducing the
relative tax of the enterprise relocating in-state.233 A rule requiring states to
contain their tax incentives within activities taxable only to in-state enterprises
would do little to further the goals of illegalizing discriminatory taxes or
mitigating interstate competition for business and its resultant economic
distortion.234

231. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 3, at 434-36 (“The statutory provisions establishing ITC’s
typically include an express requirement that qualifying investments must be located within the
state, leaving little room for question that the provisions discriminate on their faces.”). This
conclusion also finds support in the language of six Dormant Commerce Clause cases involving
tax incentives that the Court has heard since 1977. In each of the six cases the Court ruled against
the operation of the state statute. See Roundtable, 56 STATE TAX REV. 49, at 9 (1995). For
example, in Boston Stock Exchange the Court struck down a New York law that imposed a higher
tax burden on interstate sales of securities than those that were conducted wholly in New York.
See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331. The Court found the law prevented tax-neutral
decisions about when and where to purchase securities and created both a local advantage to New
York and a discriminatory burden on neighboring states. See id. The result was a tax structure
that diverted sales from their “most economically efficient channels” in a manner which was
“wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 336.
Moreover, of the state statutes involved in these six cases, the one at issue in
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984), bears the most resemblance to the
economic development incentives discussed herein. In Westinghouse, the Court invalidated a
New York state tax credit that accrued as a percentage of the gross receipts from export products
shipped from a taxpayer’s regular place of business within New York. See id. at 407. The Court
found that the “discriminatory economic effect” of a tax credit that favored local transactions was
indistinguishable from a tax that simply imposed a higher rate on out-of-state transactions, as in
Boston Stock Exchange. Id. at 404-05. Thus, the tax credit improperly fostered local
development by creating a preferential trade area within a state’s borders in contravention of the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 405.
232. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 446-47.
233. See id. at 447.
234. This is because one of two results would ensue. On the one hand, if the relative share of
a single state’s tax revenue shifted from activities taxable only to in-state enterprises to activities
taxable to all, the constitutional property tax abatement and the unconstitutional investment tax
credit ultimately would become equally discriminatory. In effect, out-of-state businesses would
share a greater percentage of the cumulative state tax burden. This first result, however, is
unlikely, because an increase in tax on other economic activities would have the effect of
discouraging such activities. The second result would either be an increase in the tax burden
borne by individuals, or, more likely, a decrease in the availability of public goods and services,
which is the very problem which gave rise to the search for this attempted solution.
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Bright lines become even more muddled when one considers the differing
treatment of incentives in the form of cash outlays versus those in the form of
tax relief. The Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of direct
expenditures to encourage investment, but early indications were that the Court
seemed to assume their constitutionality.235 In the words of the Court, “[d]irect
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the
Commerce Clause]; discriminatory taxation . . . does.”236 This assumption
runs against the common logic that a location incentive is economically
equivalent whether it is given before taxes become due or afterwards.
Legitimate efforts have been made to distinguish direct subsidies from taxes on
the basis of their political visibility,237 but nonetheless several commentators
have properly questioned the assumption that a determination that a state
program is a “subsidy” or a “tax credit” should be the touchstone of the
constitutional analysis.238
The Double-Negative Commerce Clause. Even more troubling than the
incoherence in the application of the Court’s anti-discrimination case law to
location incentives, generally, is the clarity with which the law seems to
illegalize the very accountability measures designed to curb, in the absence of
congressional action, the deleterious effects of economically distorting
subsidies in the first place. For example, Indiana’s Economic Development for
a Growing Economy Tax Credit239 expressly requires, as a precondition to
obtaining the credit, a showing that the recipient business is actively being
courted by other states and that there is a disparity between the cost of locating
in such states and the cost of locating in Indiana.240 Illinois’ “High Impact
Business” tax credit241 provides for automatic rescission of the credit if it is
determined that the recipient would have otherwise relocated to Illinois absent

235. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
236. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
237. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 847-48; Enrich, supra note 3, at 442-43.
See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 591 (1997).
238. For critical commentary, see generally BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION
OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §6.06[G], at 6-77 et seq. (1999); Note, Functional
Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1537 (1997);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?,
112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998). For a Supreme Court criticism, see Rosenberger v. Rector of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 859 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A tax exemption is in
many cases economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy.”).
See also West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that subsidies funded out of general revenues always have the effect of burdening
interstate commerce because at least a portion of those revenues derive from taxes on out-of-state
products).
239. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (West 1996).
240. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 483.
241. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5 (West 1993).
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the credit.242 Given that the diversion of business from its “most economically
efficient channels” is “wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the
Commerce Clause,”243 those portions of the Indiana and Illinois statutes which
seek to enforce the otherwise unstated purpose of the incentive could hardly be
said to withstand constitutional scrutiny. In other words, even though the
diversion of business from its “most economically efficient channels” would
actually increase absent that language, it is precisely that language which
renders such incentive packages facially discriminatory and hence
unconstitutional. Indeed, the Toledo litigation244 seeks to invalidate an Ohio
property tax exemption solely on the grounds that it is “conditioned upon the
taxpayer’s agreement to provide a specified number of jobs, and a specified
volume of investment, within the state of Ohio.”245
The end result of that logic is the use of the Commerce Clause, through
years of judicial interpretation, to undermine the very purposes it was designed
to serve. The inherent tension in the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause
is between, on the one hand, the desire to avert “jealousies and aggressions”246
among the several states by “creat[ing] an area of free trade” free from
parochial interference247 and, on the other hand, “considerations of state
sovereignty [and] the role of each State ‘as guardian and trustee for its
people.’”248 Severing an allegedly constitutional location incentive from its
allegedly unconstitutional enforcement mechanism serves neither side of that
debate.
Instead, it interferes with state autonomy by declaring as
unconstitutional the only realistic means by which a state can ensure its
treasury is put to productive use in the “economic war among the states” while
sanctioning competitive state efforts that prolong the distorting effects of that
war on the national economy. What remains is a constitutional black hole,
where “the essential and patently unobjectionable [function] of state
government—to serve the citizens of the State”249 is paralyzed, and the
Commerce Clause collapses inward to serve a purpose directly opposite of that
which its authors intended.
States as Market Participants. There is some merit to the argument that in
contracting for benefits to its citizens in exchange for financial relief, the state
is acting as a participant in the market for investment, thus placing location

242. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5(f).
243. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
244. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
245. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to All Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Re:
Inapplicability of Commerce Clause at 28, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00cv7247).
246. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
247. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
248. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980).
249. Id. at 442.
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incentives in a category of cases with which the Commerce Clause is
unconcerned.250 States that are acting as market participants, not as market
regulators, are free to act in a manner that discriminates against out-of-state
interests where Congress is otherwise silent on the issue.251 The justification is
that when the state is acting as market participant, the citizens of that state, and
not the outside interests, are bearing the burden of providing the in-state
benefit.252 Similarly, when a development authority is contracting with
businesses to induce the development of new facilities and new jobs, the state
is acting simultaneously as an investor and a promoter, and its taxpayers are
the ones that bear the burden if the venture fails. Thus, in specifying
conditions under which the assistance is to be given, the state is doing nothing
more than a private actor might do in the same situation.
It has been argued that the market participant exception may not apply,
however, where accountability measures in subsidies and incentive tax credits
are used to foster goals that are unrelated to the state’s proprietary interest in
market transactions.253 For example, one commentator notes that a property
tax exemption used as an inducement to relocate within the state and tied to the
requirement that the recipient pay its employees a minimum salary may not
provide the essential nexus to qualify for the exception.254 In other words, the
incentive improperly ties the exemption to an activity, the payment of
employees, entirely distinct from the state’s investment in the property.255
Here the state is arguably using contractual arrangements to act as regulators.
It might be argued, then, that almost all recapture provisions invalidate a
location incentive that otherwise would fall under the market participant
exception.256
As with the case law from which the exception was carved, the severance
of the allegedly unconstitutional accountability measure from the allegedly
constitutional incentive undermines both the “creation of a barrier-free market”
motive of and the “state autonomy” limitation on the Commerce Clause.
Certainly, a more sensible policy would be one that fosters a “[s]tate’s power

250. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding,
under the market participant exception, a city requirement that half of all workers on publicly
funded construction projects be local residents).
251. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 11.9, at 183 (3d ed. 1999); see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429
(holding that a state may, as market participant, limit the sale of cement produced at a stateoperated cement plant to its own residents).
252. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at 184.
253. See Moss et al., supra note 159, at 68.
254. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 826.
255. See id.
256. See generally Edward P. Lazarus, The Commerce Clause Limitation on the Power to
Condemn a Relocation, 96 YALE L.J. 1343 (1987).
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to experiment with different methods of encouraging local industry,”257 while
containing any “distorting effects on the geography of production.”258 That
policy is furthered by a structure of state economic development that courts
enterprises on the basis of their synergies with surrounding communities and
the likelihood that development assistance, if pursued nationwide, will
collectively nurture, rather than sap, the internal public resources of those
communities. Those portions of state statutes that require, as a precondition to
the giving of assistance, specific findings as to the net public benefit of such a
transaction, and ensure those benefits by instituting financial consequences in
the event of non-compliance, are thus the saving grace of such statutes, rather
than their downfall, in terms of their conformity with the underlying purposes
of the Commerce Clause.259
Consider, again, the distinction made in the case law between subsidies
and discriminatory tax provisions. As this Note has demonstrated, if
classification as a “subsidy” were all that is necessary to constitutionally
sanctify a location incentive, then “little imagination is required to foresee
future state actions ‘set[ting] barrier[s] to traffic between one state and another
as effective as if customs duties . . . had been laid . . . .’”260 The underlying
justifications for the distinction, however, are sound, even if actual practice
does not support the classification terms. One justification is that a subsidy, as
part of a state’s annual appropriations, is made public and exposed to recurring
review, whereas tax credits, as a permanent statutory feature, are more
A second is that tax credits are
insulated from political checks.261
indiscriminate and available to all who meet the statutory requisites, while
subsidies are traditionally targeted for their unique community benefit.262 A
third justification is that subsidies are given in a fixed amount, but tax
deductions and credits, being dependent on the amount of taxable income or
property for which the beneficiary receives a percentage exemption, are
dynamic and often uncapped.263 When accountability legislation requires the
targeting of specific businesses on the basis of expected public benefits,
subjects the financial assistance to meaningful and ongoing review, and

257. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1974) (Stevens, J., concurring).
258. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994).
259. The corollary of that conclusion is that indiscriminate and unchecked development
incentives are more likely to be found contrary to the protection of a national common market.
For that reason, this Note does not take issue with at least one of the claims in the pending Toledo
litigation and will not enter the debate as to whether location incentives, as a whole, should be
upheld or struck down.
260. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 828-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alterations in
original).
261. See Zelinsky, supra note 238, at 401-03.
262. See id., at 404-06.
263. See id., at 401-03.
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bestows the power to rescind, modify or recoup the assistance given, it renders
location incentives more like the presumably constitutional “subsidy” rather
than the discriminatory tax.
Finally, not all state policies that have the obvious purpose or effect of
discriminating against out-of-state interests are prohibited by the Constitution.
For example, policies such as the reduction of college tuition for residents, the
award of social welfare benefits and payments to physicians in rural and lowincome areas, are commonly accepted as legally permissible without
litigation.264 The common thread of these policies is that they are state
expenditures in support of public goods and services, in furtherance of “the
essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government.”265 In the
current interstate competition for location of businesses, states are attempting,
albeit misguidedly, to employ a private intermediary to accomplish these
public goals. Ultimately, however, the extent to which authorizing statutes
guarantee the investment is put to public purposes is directly proportional to
the extent to which the state is acting as a “purchaser” of public goods within
the meaning of the market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
With the recent enactment of accountability legislation, over sixty
jurisdictions have taken the first step in striking a balance between the pressure
to remain competitive as an attractive location for industry and the need to
ensure that their financial stake is not abused. As this Comment illustrates,
careful drafting of the provisions therein, after giving consideration to contract
law, political and economic concerns, and constitutional issues, will be the
ultimate factor in determining whether these statutes sink or swim. Ultimately,
however, their mere enactment is a signal to other legislators that states and
municipalities may empower themselves to make economic development more
efficient and curb the shift in resources from valuable public goods and
services to the private concerns of those wielding more substantial economic
clout.
IVAN C. DALE

264. See BITTKER, supra note 238, at 6-76.
265. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980).
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